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Are certain ethnic cleavages more conflict-prone than others? While only
few scholars focus on the contents of ethnicity, most of those who do argue that
political violence is more likely to occur along religious divisions than linguistic
ones. We challenge this claim by proposing the path from linguistic differences
to ethnic civil war along three theoretical steps: (1) the perception of grievances
by group members, (2) rebel mobilization, and (3) government accommodation
of rebel demands. Our argument is tested with a new dataset of ethnic cleavages
that records multiple linguistic and religious segments for ethnic groups from 1946
to 2009. Adopting a relational perspective, we assess ethnic differences between
potential challengers and the politically dominant group in each country. Our
findings indicate that intrastate conflict is more likely within linguistic dyads
than among religious ones. Moreover, we find no support for the thesis that
Muslim groups are particularly conflict-prone.
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Ethnic Cleavages and Civil War
Whether or not arguing that ethnic grievances cause civil war, conflict researchers
typically adopt a formal, encompassing approach to ethnicity that draws no distinc-
tion between its key dimensions, such as language, religion, caste, or race. The vast
majority of scholars thus follows Barth (1969) who defines ethnicity in terms of bound-
aries or cleavages rather than in terms of its specific contents (cf. Brubaker, 2009).
Departing from this scholarly practice, Juergensmeyer (1993), Laitin (2000) and others
have singled out religion as being more conflict-prone than other ethnic dimensions
(for a summary, see Gorski and Türkmen-Dervişoğlu, 2013). In the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, this hypothesis has gained considerable cur-
rency beyond academia, as illustrated by Tony Blair’s (2014) recent assertion that
“religious difference will fuel this century’s battles.” Rebellions by organizations such
as al-Quaida or ISIS seemingly confirm fears of “civilizational clashes” between major
world religions (see Huntington, 1996).
Researchers who claim that religion is the most violence-prone ethnic dimension
do so for different reasons. Some argue that religious violence results from disappoint-
ment with failed secular state-building projects (Juergensmeyer, 1993; Philpott, 2002).
Others claim that, since religious conflicts concern indivisible goods, religiously dis-
tinct groups are less likely to compromise and more likely to use political violence
(Reynal-Querol, 2002; Hassner, 2009). Finally, some expect that religious groups are
less hampered by collective action problems that impede the mobilization of rebels
compared to language groups where individual group members are assumed to pre-
fer linguistic assimilation to fighting (Laitin, 2000). In agreement with Huntington’s
civilizational thesis (1996), some of these scholars also insist that among the world
religions, it is Islam that is most conflict-prone (e.g., Toft, 2007).
We challenge the claim that religion is more salient in ethnic civil wars than lan-
guage for two reasons. First, proponents of the religion-conflict link typically focus
on isolated theoretical mechanisms without embedding them in an overarching theo-
retical model of civil conflict outbreak.1 Second, many of these empirical studies do
not compare religious differences to other ethnic dimensions. In response, we adopt
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a more comprehensive theoretical framework that allows us to evaluate the conflict-
fueling force of both religious and linguistic cleavages along a chain of mechanisms that
link ethnic divisions with civil conflict. This theoretical framework allows us to identify
a logic of mobilization for linguistically distinct ethnic groups that has been overlooked
by the proponents of the religion-conflict link.
Our analysis relies on the new Ethnic Power Relations – Ethnic Dimensions (EPR-
ED) dataset, which provides detailed information about groups’ ethnic setup. Thanks
to their linguistic and anthropological roots, these data offer a more exogenous starting
point of inquiry than ex-post codings of ethnic mobilization. Moreover, by extending
the geographic and temporal coverage, the EPR-ED dataset allows us to examine a
much larger sample of countries than has hitherto been possible. In fact, the current
dataset covers all politically relevant groups around the world from 1946 through 2009.
Featuring several linguistic and religious segments per group, it refrains from defining
members of a given group as being either linguistic or religious, thereby avoiding ex-
post facto assessments of the relevant cleavage in a given ethnic conflict. In addition,
coding multiple linguistic and religious segments per group enables us to capture the
cross-cutting nature of cleavages between groups. Based on these data, we adopt a
relational approach that explicitly assesses groups’ ethnic differences in relation to the
politically predominant ethnic group for each country-year.
Our empirical findings lend no support to the claim that religious differences are
responsible for more outbreaks of ethnic civil war than linguistic cleavages. In fact, for
the period since World War II, language is more clearly associated with ethnic conflict
than religion. Nor is there any indication that Muslim identities are overrepresented in
our conflict statistics. Without discounting religion as an important source of conflict
in the contemporary world, we conclude that recent scholarly claims that religion is
the most important conflict dimension have been overstated.
The next section introduces our theoretical framework that links cleavages to con-
flict, and compares the conflict-potential of both linguistic and religious divisions. We
then present the EPR-ED dataset before testing our argument and discussing the im-
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plications of our results for future research.
Ethnic cleavages and civil war
Departing from the Barthian view of ethnicity as a formal and modular boundary
marker, recent conflict studies focus on specific ethnic dimensions, in particular reli-
gion (Reynal-Querol, 2002; Fox, 2004; Toft, 2007). Claiming that religious cleavages
are more conflict-prone than other ethnic markers, proponents of the religion-conflict
link usually build their theoretical argument upon one theoretical mechanism. Laitin
(2000), for example, compares religious and linguistic groups in their ability to over-
come the collective action dilemma while Toft (2007) highlights the indivisibility of
religious claims.
These arguments by themselves are important, but do not go far enough in ex-
plaining the link between specific ethnic markers and intrastate conflict, particularly if
they are only applied to religion but not to other ethnic dimensions (Juergensmeyer,
1993; Toft, 2007; Hassner, 2009).2 Therefore, we compare the conflict-inducing effect
of linguistic and religious cleavages directly, by analyzing three stages in the process
that leads from categorical inequalities to civil war.
More specifically, we build on classical theories of ethnic conflict that link categorical
inequalities between ethnic groups to grievances among disadvantaged group members
(Gurr et al., 1993; Petersen, 2002; Stewart, 2008; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch,
2011; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). Grievances as a motive for conflict by
themselves, however, do not go far enough in explaining the onset of civil war. As Tilly
(1978) notes, individual mechanisms such as the perception of grievances by group
members are insufficient to guarantee the outbreak of conflict (see also Gurr, 2000).
Thus, we also focus on the organizational resources that are necessary to overcome the
collective action problem among group members and to recruit rebels (Tilly, 1978).
Finally, we consider the effect of repressive and accommodating government reactions
on the risk of civil war outbreak .
Are religious cleavages indeed more conflict-prone than linguistic ones? We evaluate
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this question by systematically examining three stages from inequalities to conflict
onset for both religious and linguistic ethnic divisions (cf. Gurr et al., 1993; Cederman,
Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). First, how do group-level inequalities along religious
and linguistic dimensions come to be perceived as collective grievances? Second, how
are these two types of ethnic groups able to overcome the collective action dilemma?
And third, what are governments’ options to accommodate these ethnic challengers?
By inspecting the entire pathway to intrastate conflict onset, our theoretical approach
makes it possible to reveal arguments for the connection between linguistic cleavages
and civil war that have been overlooked by the proponents of the religion-conflict
link, leading us to conclude that linguistic differences are at least as conflict-prone as
religious ones.
Perception of grievances
We begin by discussing the transformation of inter-ethnic inequalities into collective
grievances that provide the motivation for civil war. Juergensmeyer (1993) was among
the first to argue that religion re-emerges as a basis for collectively felt grievances due
to disappointment with failed projects of “secular nationalism.” Predicting a “Clash
of Civilizations” between major world religions, Huntington (1993, 26) expects that
“animosities stretching . . . back deep into history” such as the Western crusades will
replace other motives for conflict such as ethno-linguistic desires for self-determination.
Huntington and others also argue that grievances in response to a disappointing secular
order are particularly acute in the Islamic world which is why Muslims are more fre-
quently involved in intrastate conflict than members of other religions (see, e.g., Toft,
2007; Fox, 2012).
While there may be some truth to these claims in specific cases, it is important to re-
alize that grievances are not necessarily expressed in religious terms even where religious
differences exist. For example, long-lasting intrastate conflicts in the Philippines and
Thailand are often interpreted as clashes between Muslim minorities and other domi-
nant religions but are in fact fundamentally about ethno-linguistic self-determination
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as Liow (2006) shows. In particular where violent conflicts are interpreted as being
only about one issue, it is easy to lose sight of alternative conflict issues (see Kalyvas,
2003).3
Indeed, collective grievances are at least as likely to emerge along linguistic cleav-
ages. The most important reason is that individuals cannot escape the pervasiveness
of language in both politics and everyday life. According to Brubaker (2013, 5–6), lan-
guage “is an inescapable medium of public discourse, government, administration, law,
courts, education, media and public signage.” Because states simply cannot be neutral
with respect to language, speakers of minority languages are often disadvantaged when
dealing with state agents. Even under federal and cultural autonomy arrangements,
desires for self-determination among linguistically distinct groups might persist as in
Quebec or the Basque country. Moreover, in many less developed countries, jobs in the
bureaucracy are one of the very few reliable sources of economic well-being, and access
to state employment is frequently restricted by linguistic discrimination (Lewis, 1992;
Wimmer, 1997; Bayart, 2009). This is not to say that individuals who do not speak the
dominant language are incapable of learning it. However, they usually cannot master
it at the same level of proficiency as native-speakers (Hyltenstam and Abrahamsson,
2000). Unlike religious affiliation, which is typically less visible in personal encoun-
ters, even minor linguistic distinctions are easily noticeable and often carry important
symbolic meaning, especially where national identity is linguistically defined. In these
cases, Gellner’s (1983, 58–62) fictitious example of Ruritania highlights how the per-
ception of being second-class citizen among speakers of a minority language spurs their
desire for self-determination. Likewise Horowitz (2000, 222) articulates the economic
and psychological logic of linguistic grievances elegantly:
[Language] links political claims to ownership with psychological demands
for the affirmation of group worth, and it ties this aggregate matter of
group status to outright careerism, thereby binding elite material interests
to mass concerns. . . Religion can sometimes link elite and mass concerns.
But clearly it is more plausible to think that fluency in the working language
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of a bureaucracy will become an issue more often than will facility in scrip-
ture. Language is so often an issue not because there is something special
about linguistic differences or something mystical and therefore conflict-
producing about the process of communication. The reason is more mun-
dane: in a multilingual state, there has to be a language policy to decide
trivial and important issues of linguistic choice.
In sum, collective grievances may emerge along linguistic and religious cleavages.
However, the omnipresent pervasiveness of language in daily life is likely to make
language the more prevalent source of perceived injustice.
Rebel mobilization
Following our framework from inequalities to conflict further, grievances alone do not
cause rebellions. For this to happen, rebel leaders need to overcome the collective
action dilemma and mobilize fighters (Tilly, 1978; Lichbach, 1998). Adopting an in-
strumentalist logic, Laitin (2000) argues that individuals who belong to distinct reli-
gious groups are more likely to overcome collective action problems than members of
language groups who can opt for linguistic assimilation instead of risking their lives by
joining a rebellion (see also Laitin, 1998).4 In contrast, it is more difficult for mem-
bers of religious groups to convert to other creeds. Moreover, religious groups can use
their pre-existing organizational resources to mobilize fighters (Stewart, 2009). Based
on these arguments, religious elites can be expected to find it easier to set up and
maintain rebel organizations than leaders of language groups.
However, we argue that linguistic differences are at least as difficult to overcome
as religious ones. Darden (2013) shows that mass schooling instills lasting loyalties
in linguistically defined groups that “defy the [instrumental] incentives presented in a
given situation” and motivate extreme personal sacrifices (ibid., p.5). More generally,
Anderson (2006) highlights how mass media, such as newspapers, create “imagined
communities” that constitute the basis for nationalist mobilization. Conversely, the
absence of a unifying language can block mobilization for violence. Therefore, where
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religious groups are linguistically divided, their potential for collective action might well
be smaller. Safran and Liu (2012, 273) argue that the very preservation of religious
group identities depends on the use of a language that is distinct from the dominant
language in a state. The fact that Sunni Kurdish fighters are at the forefront of fighting
the Sunni Arab ISIS rebellion in Syria and Iraq is a clear example. Although many
religious groups have their own sacred language, such as Latin or classical Arabic, these
are rarely connected to individuals’ everyday lives. In contrast, vernacular languages
are more likely to link masses and elites (Lange and Dawson, 2010).
Moving from the masses to the elite-level, language-based networks often rival the
role of religious organizations in violent mobilization. The functional equivalent of reli-
gious schools and organizations is the university campus, which served as an important
breeding ground for ethno-nationalist movements in the former Soviet Union (Roeder,
1991), Africa (Reno, 2011, 37–75), and 19th century Europe (Hroch, 1985). Elite
networks created at universities, especially if combined with mass schooling in the rel-
evant language, offer powerful channels for spreading the message of self-determination
among members of an ethnic group. Thus, on balance, there is no reason to believe
that political entrepreneurs who express religious grievances enjoy a monopoly on mo-
bilization for violent collective action.
Government reaction
Even in the presence of widespread grievances and mobilization, the occurrence of
intrastate war depends on the government’s decision to either escalate the conflict or
to accommodate the demands of the ethnically defined opposition. With regard to
this last step, theorists of the religion-conflict link suggest that governments find it
harder to satisfy the demands of ethno-religious challengers because these conflicts
concern indivisible goods, such as the primacy of one god over another (Toft, 2007,
101). Along these lines, Hassner (2009) argues that “sacred sites” claimed by multiple
religious actors, such as the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, cannot be shared and are
therefore constant sources of violent conflict. Toft (2007) also suggests that the problem
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of indivisibility is particularly pronounced in the Islamic world where religion and
politics are not separated, and civil wars should therefore be especially likely in these
countries.
While it may indeed be difficult for governments or state elites to find common
ground with religious challengers, it is important to note that states can always declare
religious neutrality by delegating religious matters to the individual or by recognizing
multiple religions at the same time. As Goddard (2006) notes, indivisibility is itself
socially constructed. In contrast, the state has to choose at least one working language,
and introducing multilingualism is far more expensive since it involves the training of
teachers and administrators in different languages and extensive translation of public
documents. Unsurprisingly, many states refrain from offering language concessions on
cost grounds. Liu’s (2011, 130) global analysis of language rights in democracies reveals
that there is any recognition of minority languages in only about half of all cases. Since
her assessment does not distinguish between groups within states, it is likely that an
even larger number of languages are legally unprotected.
The admittedly extreme example of the European Union vividly illustrates the eco-
nomic costs of a multi-linguistic regime. In the European Parliament translation and
interpretation services make up one third of the administrative staff and account for
half of the parliamentary budget (Corbett, Jacobs and Shakleton, 2011, 43). If it is
“prohibitively expensive for the EU to provide interpretation services for every meet-
ing amongst civil servants,” as Patten and Kymlicka (2003, 9) argue, it is impossible
for poorer multiethnic states. Whereas issue indivisibility might hinder compromise
between distinct religious groups, economic considerations make it at least as difficult
for governments to accommodate the demands of language groups.
Concluding our theoretical discussion, we note that both cleavage dimensions may
be linked to collective grievances, offer the potential for rebel mobilization, and pose
obstacles to the accommodation of violent challengers. Therefore, we reject the idea
of a specific conflict-fueling effect of religion, but expect ethnic civil conflicts along
linguistic lines to be at least as likely as those between religiously distinct groups.
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Empirically, most studies define conflicts as either religious or not religious (see,
e.g., Fox, 2002, 2004; Svensson, 2007; Toft, 2007). Yet, this obscures the potential
interaction of linguistic and religious cleavages in ethnic civil war onset (see, e.g.,
Selway, 2010). In the next section, we introduce a new dataset that allows us to
directly compare linguistic and religious cleavages, and their interaction without pre-
determining the relevance of either for any particular ethnic group or conflict.
Concepts and data
To test our claim that linguistic distinctions are at least as conflict-prone as religious
cleavages, we introduce the new Ethnic Dimensions (EPR-ED) dataset. EPR-ED
unpacks the “cultural stuff” (Barth, 1969, 15) of the ethnic groups listed in the Ethnic
Power Relations (EPR-ETH) dataset (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Cederman,
Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). Our data identify multiple ethnic segments on the
linguistic and religious dimension for each of the more than 700 ethnic groups in over
130 states where ethnicity is politically relevant in national politics. Ethnic groups are
politically relevant when group representatives make political claims on their behalf
or when then state discriminates against these groups politically. In the following, we
first introduce the coding of the linguistic and religious dimensions of ethnic groups
and then discuss the construction of our relational cleavage variables for group-dyads.
Multiple ethnic dimensions
EPR-ED introduces two key innovations: first, it codes religious and linguistic segments
for each group rather than defining groups as either linguistic or religious. This multi-
dimensional assessment enables us to avoid relying on actor claims that might be
endogenous to conflict, and also makes it possible to test arguments about cross-cutting
or reinforcing cleavage constellations. Second, our dataset codes multiple linguistic and
religious segments per group rather than identifying only one. Thereby we measure
overlap on the linguistic and religious dimensions between groups, which yields more
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precise estimates than dichotomous indicators of group differences. Figure 1 illustrates
the coding with regards to two Nigerian groups. While belonging to one religion, the
Hausa-Fulani are divided linguistically into three segments. Conversely, a linguistically
homogeneous group such as the Yoruba may count adherents from multiple religions
such as Islam and Christianity among its members. We refer to these internal-group
divisions as ethnic segments. The EPR-ED dataset identifies up to three linguistic and
religious segments for each ethnic group along with their relative demographic size.5
The Yoruba’s largest religious segment includes 43% of all group members.
Figure 1 about here.
The data on linguistic segments build on the well-known Ethnologue database,
which uses mutual intelligibility as its main criterion for identifying languages (Lewis,
2009).6 Data on religious segments derive from the Joshua Project, which connects the
language groups of Ethnologue with government statistics, and a variety of sources on
religious adherence, yielding a list of “people’s groups and their religious make-up” (see
Joshua Project: Unreached Peoples of the World, 2011).
Figure 2 shows a partial example of one of the Ethnologue language families in tree-
form where higher-order nodes indicate shared heritage between the language leaves.
The leaves on the lowest level represent spoken languages, which correspond to our
linguistic segments. The example shows four languages spoken in Nigeria that belong
to the Niger-Congo language family. Yoruba is located on the bottom-left, while the
two smaller Hausa-Fulani language segments, Adamawa and Nigerian Fulfulde, can be
found at the bottom of the middle branch. The Hausa segment is not part of the
Niger-Congo family but belongs to the Afro-Asiatic language tree. Some Ethnologue
language families such as Austronesian include more than 1200 nodes and up to 16
different levels.
Figure 2 about here.
While the linguistic hierarchies from Ethnologue are available online, equivalent
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trees for religious families had to be constructed. Figure 3 displays a subset of the
Muslim tree including the Sunni-Muslim (Maliki) segment shared by the Yoruba and
Hausa-Fulani. Resembling their linguistic counterparts in most respects, religious trees
have considerably fewer levels. While the top level of each tree captures one of the major
world religions, the sub-divisions describe denominations or major religious traditions.
The maximum number of levels in religious trees is found in the Muslim tree (4) while
the largest number of denominations is found in the Christian tree (33).
Figure 3 about here.
The dataset codes ethnic segments as time-invariant properties that do not capture
multilingual or syncretic practices primarily due to limited data availability. Time
invariance is a reasonable assumption because cultural change is usually a multi-
generational process (see, e.g., Weber, 1976). With respect to multilingualism and
syncretism, the mechanisms introduced above do not operate at the individual level
but rather at the group level. Among existing studies only Laitin (2000) approaches
the complexity of our data by coding linguistic and religious differences for group dyads
for a far smaller number of ethnic groups. Unlike all existing efforts, our dataset is
the first to code multiple sub-group segments on both ethnic dimensions, which makes
it possible to assess fine-grained ethnic differences between groups that go beyond
dichotomous difference indicators.
In sum, our dataset contains 629 unique languages and 67 distinct religious creeds
for 793 ethnic groups (also see Figure B1). These sum to 1,147 linguistic segments
and 1,535 religious segments overall. As a result, ethnic groups are more uniform
in linguistic terms than along the religious dimension. While the mean of linguistic
segments per ethnic group is approximately 1.5, it is 1.9 for religious segments.
Ethnic dyads
While scholars who subscribe to the religious-conflict link regularly identify ethnic
groups as either exclusively linguistic or religious (Fox, 2002, 2004; Svensson, 2007), the
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relevance of specific ethnic segments depends on the context and cannot be determined
a priori. Subscribing to the sociological literature on cleavages, we argue that the
conflict-proneness of religion or language needs to be analyzed relatively between groups
(Lipset and Rokkan, 1990 (1967)). Our unit of analysis is therefore the ethnic-dyad
that compares the most powerful group in a state to all other groups. This setup
is appropriate when analyzing civil wars that pit the incumbent government against
non-state actors (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009).7
We assume that the state is not ethnically neutral but usually controlled by one
specific ethnic group. This assumption holds most clearly in nation-states where one
ethno-nationalist group dominates. But even in multi-ethnic states one group usually
is more closely associated with the state than any other, and therefore the relevant
opponent in violent conflicts. Although the pre-war Yugoslav government included
Croats, Bosniaks, Macedonians, and Montenegrins next to Serbs, Serbs were clearly
the most powerful group in that coalition, and the relevant conflict actor on the side
of the government.8
We identify such a “reference group” for each country-year in two stages. First,
using the relative power ranking coded in EPR-ETH, we identify the most powerful
group(s). If one group is coded as dominant, as holding monopoly power, or as the only
senior partner, it is selected as the reference group. Second, in the few cases in which
EPR-ETH codes a power-sharing arrangement with more than one “senior partner”,
the demographically largest of the most powerful groups is selected. In Yugoslavia, for
example, all ethnic groups in power (EGIPs) hold the rank of senior partner until 1991.
Here, Serbs are selected as the most powerful group, as they constituted a demographic
plurality.9
Figure 4 illustrates our dyadic setup for Nigeria in 2006. The government coalition
consists of two included groups: the Yoruba as senior partner and the Hausa-Fulani as
junior partner. Two additional groups, the Ijaw and the Ogoni, are excluded from the
executive. In our dyadic setup all other included and excluded groups are potential
challengers of the Yoruba. In other words, we consider both challenges within the
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government coalition (infighting) and rebellions by excluded groups. As EPR codes
power shifts, the reference group sometimes changes. Prior to 1999, EPR identifies the
Hausa-Fulani as dominant, and therefore all group-dyads include the Hausa-Fulani as
the reference group during that period.
Figure 4 about here.
Cleavage variables
We are now ready to introduce our cleavage variables, which combine the data on
linguistic and religious segments with the dyadic setup introduced above. For each
group dyad and ethnic dimension, we compare the segments, and note whether a
difference exists or not.10 Recall the example of the Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani. On the
linguistic dimension, the two groups differ completely since none of the three Hausa-
Fulani languages is spoken by the Yoruba. In contrast, the Yoruba’s Sunni Muslim
(Maliki) religious segments corresponds to the Hausa-Fulani’s only religious affiliation.
We therefore code a difference for two of the three religious segments of the Yoruba
but not for the Sunni Muslim (Maliki) segment. We repeat this exercise for all ethnic
group-dyads and country-years on both the linguistic and religious dimensions.
A second step incorporates the information on segment size in order to determine
whether linguistic and religious differences exist. We first compute linguistic and re-
ligious dummy variables that take the value of one whenever more than 50% of all
group members differ on the given dimension and zero otherwise. In case of the
Yoruba/Hausa-Fulani dyad, this dummy takes the value of one on both ethnic di-
mensions as only a minority of the Yoruba shares the Sunni Muslim (Maliki) affiliation
with the Hausa-Fulani. To reach a higher level of precision, we also compute the proba-
bility that two randomly selected individuals from each group speak the same language
or adhere to the same religious creed. With regards to the Nigerian example, randomly
selecting a member of each group would yield a 57% chance of selecting two individuals
with different religious beliefs (see Figure 4).11
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Our main explanatory variables thus capture three important aspects of cleavages:
their relational character, their multi-dimensional nature, and the possible overlap of
group boundaries. First, by calculating cleavages with respect to a particular reference
group, we take into account the dyadic character of civil war. Second, the coding of
both linguistic and religious cleavages recognizes that it cannot be determined a priori
which of the two markers is more relevant for a particular group, or whether both
matter at the same time. Third, our mean difference variable reflects the fuzziness of
ethnic differences by recognizing that linguistic and religious segments can cross-cut
group boundaries. Where more members of an ethnic group dyad share one cleavage
dimension, the salience of that marker to highlight group differences is likely to be
lower than where no shared ethnic dimensions exist. While capturing some aspects
of a constructivist understanding of ethnic cleavages, our measures are limited in that
they do not identify the political meaning of religion and language at a given point in
time. In the presence of both religious and linguistic cleavages, our data do not reveal
which dimension serves as the actual basis of identification.
Despite this restriction, we believe that our dataset offers improvements over ex-
isting data on ethnic groups and cleavages. Compared to existing fractionalization
indices (cf. Roeder, 2001; Alesina et al., 2003) our measures capture the ethnic-dyad
level rather than country-level variation, and clearly identify the potential combatants
in a civil war rather than comparing all groups with one another. Additionally, the ex-
plicit coding of linguistic and religious cleavages allows us to estimate both individual
cleavage dimension effects and their interaction, which country-level indices of cleavage
constellations cannot (see Selway, 2010).
Rather than comparing religious and linguistic dimensions most existing studies
on the conflict-inducing effect of ethnic cleavages identify groups as either linguistic
or religious (Svensson, 2007; Toft, 2007; Fox, 2012). This practice runs the risk of
miscoding a particular conflict or overlooking the importance of another salient conflict
dimension (cf. Kalyvas, 2003). By coding both linguistic and religious cleavages, we do
not fall into the trap of falsely attributing conflict issues to either one dimension. In the
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Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for example, linguistic nationalism arguably played a more
decisive role in the first Palestinian uprising in 1988 and religious motives became more
relevant in the Second Intifada (Litvak, 1998). Our data do not detect this change in
salient cleavages but they also do not bias the results in favor of either language or
religion. Moreover, following actor claims in order to identify the master cleavage of
particular civil wars, makes those studies, which only identify conflict dyads but omit
non-conflict dyads from their samples, vulnerable to selection bias. In contrast, our
data coded for all peaceful and conflictual ethnic dyads alike are less susceptible to
reverse causality.
Using Minorities at Risk (MAR) data by Gurr et al. (1993), Laitin (2000) considers
potential conflict dyads and compares linguistic and religious cleavages. MAR provides
a constructivist coding of policies that discriminate against linguistic and religious
identities. Selection bias is a concern here since the ethnic groups in the MAR data are
selected exactly because they are “at risk,” due to, for example, linguistic or religious
discrimination (Hug, 2003). Moreover, the MAR data cover less than half the number
of groups included in EPR and is only available for a few years at the beginning of the
1990s and 2000s.
Other variables
Our dependent variable, ethnic civil war onset, is based on the civil war coding of the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database, which uses a minimum of 25 battle deaths
as its lower threshold (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen, 2010). The
ACD2EPR Dataset connects civil wars to particular ethnic groups through the rebel
groups in the Non-State Actors (NSA) dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan,
2009; Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). A civil war is defined as ethnic if a rebel organization
fighting in it claims to do so on behalf of and recruits from a particular ethnic group.
Introducing a number of standard control variables from the literature, we assume
that inequalities and grievances increase the likelihood of civil war onset. They are
measured by two variables, one capturing the exclusion of political actors who rep-
15
Ethnic Cleavages and Civil War
resent an ethnic group from executive power, and the other a recent loss of relative
power within the previous two years (Petersen, 2002). The former reflects structural
disadvantages an ethnic group faces in the political arena while the latter reflects more
dynamic shocks to its political status. A group’s relative share of the politically rel-
evant population captures larger fighting capacity. Larger groups are more likely to
fight than smaller groups as, on average, they have a larger pool of potential recruits
and supporters if recruitment occurs along ethnic lines. Both the grievance and the size
variables come from the EPR-ETH dataset by Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010);
Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013). Moving to the country-level, low GDP per
capita and large population size are expected to increase the likelihood of civil war
(Hegre and Sambanis, 2006).12 Finally, we control for temporal effects by including
the number of previous civil wars fought by a group, a linear term for peace-years, and
three cubic splines (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998).
Analysis
This section tests our main theoretical claim that linguistic differences are at least as
conflict-prone as religious cleavages.13 First, we discuss the bivariate relationships of
civil war onset and the two ethnic cleavages. While civil wars are about nine times more
frequent in the presence of linguistic differences than in their absence, the corresponding
ratio for religious differences is merely two (also see Table C1).14 Although religious
differences are significantly related to civil war onset in this simple setup their effect is
far weaker than that of linguistic differences. These results should be interpreted with
caution, however, because other factors may affect the association. In order to gauge
their individual effects we include both cleavage types in a number of logit regressions
with robust country-clustered standard errors.
Table 1 presents four regression models. Model 1 introduces the mean difference
variables that measure the degree of difference for linguistic and religious cleavages for
both languages and religions in addition to a range of standard controls as described
in the previous section. Model 2 replaces the mean difference variables with their
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majority equivalents that record a “1” whenever more than 50% of group members
differ on one of the dimensions. In Models 1 and 2, the cleavage variables overlap.
This means that for those dyads that differ along both ethnic dimensions, the two
cleavage variables each indicate the respective difference values. In contrast, Model 3
adds a third dummy variable that identifies those ethnic dyads that differ on both
cleavage dimensions. Thus, the three dummy variables in this model indicate whether
a given ethnic dyad is only linguistically distinct, only religiously distinct, and both
linguistically and religiously distinct. This allows us to assess the conflict risk of ethnic
dyads characterized by reinforcing cleavages compared to those where at least one
ethnic dimension cross-cuts group boundaries (cf. Chandra, 2005). Finally, Model 4
includes all cases with both religious and linguistic cleavages in the religious category
and compares them to those dyads that differ only on the linguistic dimension. Hence,
this is an easy test for the religion-conflict thesis and a hard test for our counter-claim.
Table 1 about here.
Across all specifications, the effect of linguistic differences on the risk of ethnic
conflict is positive and statistically significant. In contrast, the estimated coefficients
for religious differences fall short of conventional levels of statistical significance in
Models 1 to 3: in the first two models, they are essentially zero. Moreover, Wald tests
of equality reject the null hypothesis that religious cleavages have the same effect on
civil war onset as linguistic differences (p=.045 in Model 1, p=.007 in Model 2, and
p=.054 in Model 3). Only in Model 4, where we interpret all mixed dyads as religious
ones, does the estimated effect of religion reach conventional levels of significance.
Yet, even under these unlikely assumptions, the residual cases with only linguistic
differences exert a substantially larger effect on the risk of ethnic conflict than religious
differences. This finding lends support to the theoretical mechanisms we proposed
above with respect to linguistic cleavages, while casting doubts on claims about the
conflict-inducing effect of religious cleavages. Finally, in Model 3, the effect of language
is not statistically different from those cases where both cleavages reinforce one another
17
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(p=.174). Thus, our results deviate from previous findings that report a lower risk of
civil war for cases with cross-cutting cleavages (Dunning and Harrison, 2010; Selway,
2010).15
The results of the control variables are in accordance with previous findings. Exclu-
sion from executive power or a recent downgrading of a group’s power status substan-
tively and significantly increases the likelihood of conflict onset. Additionally, larger
groups and past conflict likewise increase the probability of ethnic civil war while higher
economic development at the country level makes civil war less likely. In sum, even
after the introduction of important control variables, linguistic differences are very
strongly linked to ethnic conflict probability while religious differences exert a much
weaker effect in the post-World War II period.16
Spatio-temporal variations
Our main results indicate that civil wars are more likely to be fought along linguistic
cleavages than religious ones. In the following, we subject this finding to a variety
of sensitivity analyses, foremost because the results are likely to exhibit considerable
regional and temporal variation. Moreover, it is necessary to test alternative opera-
tionalizations of ethnic cleavages. The results presented below, however, demonstrate
that such considerations do not undermine our general finding.
The relative importance of language and religion may vary across world regions due
to distinct political and economic conditions. According to Gellner (1983), linguistic
differences should be especially consequential in societies that are thoroughly industri-
alized and where mass literacy has made major advances. This implies that Eastern
Europe and Asia should be more likely to host ethnic conflict along linguistic cleavages
than Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, the apparent importance of Islam and the lower
frequency of linguistic cleavages due to the widely shared Arabic language should make
religious differences particularly conflict-prone in the Middle East.
Figure 5 shows the estimated size and accuracy of the language and religion co-
efficients for five world regions (also see Table C1 in our Online Appendix).17 While
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highly relevant for conflict in Eastern Europe and Asia, linguistic cleavages are an
even stronger covariate of conflict than religious differences in the Middle East. This
is illustrated by cases of linguistically distinct ethnic groups, such as the Kurds in
Turkey and Iraq, or the Baloch and Arabs in Iran, that have engaged in multiple civil
wars with their respective governments (cf. Gurr et al., 1993, 317). The only region
where religious differences show a slightly stronger relation to conflict than linguistic
differences is Sub-Saharan Africa although the estimated difference is not statistically
significant. This is not surprising given that our theoretical argument emphasizes re-
duced individual life chances due to linguistic discrimination as one source of collective
grievances. This mechanism should be less pronounced in African states that do not
feature Gellner’s ideal type of modernizing, industrialized society because of their lack
of economic development and relatively low literacy rates. In sum, with the exception
of this part of the world, linguistic differences explain at least an equal amount, if not
more, of the variation in the likelihood of ethnic civil war onset as religious cleavages.
Figure 5 about here.
Having considered spatial differences, we now turn to temporal variation. Hunting-
ton (1993) argued that civilizational differences among world religions would become
the focal point of conflict after the Cold War. In Table 2, we therefore focus on the
time period since 1990.18 Yet, contrary to Huntington’s expectations, religious differ-
ences do not exhibit a stronger effect on ethnic conflict in the post-Cold War period
regardless of the model specification. In fact, the effect becomes even weaker. In con-
trast, the effect of linguistic differences becomes somewhat stronger during this period,
although there is no statistically significant difference between the two periods before
and after the Cold War. However, our operationalization of religious differences does
not completely match Huntington’s idea of civilizations, which is based on the highest
level of aggregation and thus predicts a clash between world religions. Accordingly,
religious differences should only matter for conflicts between Christians and Muslims,
Hindus and Sikhs, or Buddhists and Animists, but not for disputes within major reli-
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gions. To test this more specific claim, Model 7 replaces our main variable of religious
differences with an indicator that measures civilizational differences between major
world religions. Again, this expectation of Huntington is not borne out by our data as
the coefficient for civilizational differences turns negative for the period after 1989.19
Table 2 about here.
In addition to postulating religious cleavages in general as a source of violent back-
lashes, some scholars have singled out cleavages associated with Islam as particularly
susceptible to violence (Huntington, 1996; Fox, 2012). Similarly, Toft (2007) suggests
that Muslim involvement in civil wars is disproportionally frequent. In Figure 6, we
compare dyads with at least one Muslim group to dyads encompassing groups of all
other major world religions (see Table C2). Instead of our relational cleavage variable,
we include major religion dummies that indicate the majority religions of the groups
in the dyad. For example, the Muslim dummy variable is coded as “1” for every dyad,
in which more than 50% of the members of at least one group are Muslims. We chose
dyads that include Christian groups as our baseline category since most of them are sit-
uated in the West – the region with the least amount of civil wars. We find that dyads
that include Muslim groups are indeed more likely to experience ethnic civil war than
dyads that include Christian groups. Yet, with respect to all major religions except for
groups that are predominantly atheist, the t-test results reveal that the differences are
not statistically significant. In view of these findings, we reject the claim that Islam is
a particularly conflict-prone religion.
Figure 6 about here.
In contrast to Toft’s approach, which is reflected in Figure 9, our empirical strategy
is relational. Following this line, we construct a new dummy variable that identifies all
dyads that include either one Muslim group and one non-Muslim group or two groups
of different Muslim denominations (for example, Sunnis and Shi’a). Thus, cases of
infighting between moderate and extremist Muslims as, for instance, the intrastate
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conflict between the Pakistani government and the Pakistani Taliban, are not consid-
ered here. Model 8 in Table 2 uses this new Muslim dummy variable along with a
residual religious difference dummy that identifies the remaining dyads that are reli-
giously distinct. The results reveal that dyads consisting of Muslims and non-Muslims
or of two different Muslim denominations are not more likely to experience ethnic civil
war than other ethnic dyads. Yet, the effect of the residual religious difference variable
now becomes negative, which means that without Muslims, religious differences might
actually decrease conflict risk. In other words, Toft might be right in that Muslim
differences are more often associated with ethnic conflict - but this is only true in re-
lation to other religious differences, not in relation to other cleavage dimensions (also
see Table D2).
Additional robustness tests
Following up the evaluation of spatio-temporal variations, the current section exposes
our findings to a number of additional sensitivity tests (see Section D in our Online
Appendix for details). This analysis shows that the main result exposing the weakness
of religious cleavages as an explanation of civil war holds up regardless of whether one
controls for temporal heterogeneity (Table D1 and Figures D1 and D2) or introduces
alternative specifications of the cleavages variables (Table D2 and D3) and the ethnic
dyad (Table D4). By comparing each ethnic group to all ethnic groups in power
(EGIPs), we also account for conflicts that occur among two peripheral groups – one
of which is a member of the government coalition – and later escalate to civil wars
(Lacina, 2013).
In addition, a series of models explores possible sensitivity to uncontrolled variance
and endogeneity (see Tables D5-D11). Using multi-way clustering, hierarchical models,
and fixed effects at the level of countries and years, this analysis further bolsters the
robustness of the main results. Although the underlying EPR data were selected with
respect to political relevance, there is also no reason to believe that this selection
criterion introduces systematic bias in favor of any particular cleavage dimension or
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cases that involved conflict. It is correct that our data contain far more linguistic than
religious segments (see Figure B1), but this imbalance matters little for our analysis
as the difference in the frequency of linguistic and religious differences is much smaller
(see Table C1).20
As opposed to claims-based codings of cleavage dimensions, the EPR-ED data
themselves can be considered relatively immune to endogeneity with respect to conflict
thanks to their origin in ethnographic data that were collected by researchers who have
no particular interest in conflict. As argued above, our cleavage variables only change
very slowly over time on the aggregate group-level (Weber, 1976), and are thus unlikely
to be endogenous to civil war. We therefore refrain from any formal instrumentation of
our cleavage variables, which is in line with the standard practise in economic studies
that investigate the effects of structural diversity on public goods provision or conflict
(see, e.g., Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Esteban and Ray, 2011; Spolaore and
Wacziarg, 2013).21
Conclusion
In this paper we have revisited the relationship between language, religion, and ethnic
civil war. We find that linguistic cleavages are overrepresented as a potential source
of such violence compared to religious differences. These findings cast doubts on the
claim that religion is a more divisive cleavage than language. Moreover, our findings
lend little support to recent studies that attribute an especially destabilizing potential
to cleavages involving Muslim groups compared to other major world religions.
Stressing the political logic of grievances, rebel mobilization, and the accommoda-
tion of rebel demands by governments, this study compares the conflict potential of
linguistic and religious differences by considering how they influence the main mecha-
nisms that link horizontal inequalities to civil war. While our empirical results corrob-
orate the link between linguistic cleavages and ethnic civil war, future research needs
to examine the individual mechanisms of our theoretical framework more closely.
Although we have found much less evidence for the religion-conflict link than the
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existing literature, we do not deny the fact that the political activation of religious
cleavages has triggered ethnic conflict in many instances. When both linguistic and
religious differences are present, our data do not reveal which of these cleavages is
more important in a conflict. While this would be desirable, it is also important to
bear in mind that it is often difficult to identify the most salient cleavage in a particular
conflict (Kalyvas, 2003). Not all rebels of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
organization, for example, are motivated by religious ideology. Instead, many Sunni
Arabs have joined the rebel group in response to discriminatory state policies by the
Shi’a dominated government. As we demonstrate, the relative salience of cleavages
also depends on regional context with significantly higher levels of linguistic conflict in
Eastern Europe and Asia compared to the rest of the world while temporal variation
seems to be less pronounced. Our analysis may also underestimate the effect of religion
because it does not focus on conflicts between moderates and extremists within a given
religious group. In order to more clearly understand the precise role of both religious
and linguistic divisions in the emergence of ethnic civil war, future research needs to
collect data on actors’ claims and government policies with respect to language and
religion.
Overall, however, our results suggest that much of the literature focusing on religion
and violence has tended to be one-sided and too narrow. The present study prompts
us to rethink overly alarmist renderings that religious cleavages are becoming more
violent, especially those that involve Muslim groups. Through the EPR-ED dataset we
now have a new and powerful tool at our disposal by which we can more thoroughly
assess the differential impact of specific cleavage types by considering the structural
preconditions around the world without limiting the sample to conflict cases. Thanks
to its wide coverage and relatively exogenous nature, it is becoming easier to detect
patterns linking the contents of ethnicity to conflict processes.
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Notes
1In the remainder of this study, we will interchangeably refer to ethnic civil war
onset as civil war, intrastate conflict, civil conflict, rebellion, or ethnic conflict. Our
main research focus is thus on civil wars between a government and ethnically defined
challengers. We consider neither non-ethnic civil wars nor communal conflicts without
government involvement.
2Laitin (2000) is an exception here.
3Kalyvas also suggests that ISIS, although rooted in fundamentalist religious ide-
ology, is far better understood as a revolutionary actor that could as easily draw
on nationalist and other ethnic identities: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/07/the-logic-of-violence-in-islamic-states-war/
4Other conflict researchers question the importance of the collective action dilemma
as a fundamental obstacle to mobilization (Staniland, 2014). Kalyvas and Kocher
(2007), for example, argue that defecting is likely to be more dangerous than fighting.
5In principle, a politically relevant ethnic group in EPR-ETH could consist of more
than three linguistic or religious segments but in the vast majority of cases they do
not. In exceptional cases such as the Indigenous Peoples in Brazil, we only coded the
three largest segments. Note that a segment was only recorded if it accounted for at
least 10% of group members.
6There are some exceptions, however, which we discuss in Section A of our Online
Appendix.
7When analyzing communal conflicts between non-state actors, it would be more
appropriate to consider all ethnic group dyads in a state.
8Slovenes did not fight Croats or Montenegrins. Also see Horowitz (2002) who
argues that ethnic identities in Sub-Saharan Africa tend to polarize into dyadic blocs.
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9Overall, we applied the second coding rule only 22 times in 17 different states.
10With respect to the tree structure above, this simply means that we check whether
two groups share the same node in a tree but not whether they share any parent nodes.
Note that a new reference group implies different group dyads, and thus, changes in
our cleavage variables.
11Formally, assume a reference group A and another group B, each which have ethnic







1ab ∗ sa ∗ sb
where 1 is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the ethnic segments a and
b are different and 0 if they are the same. Summary statistics and a correlation matrix
of our main variables can be found in Section B of our Online Appendix.
12The data are taken from Hunziker and Bormann (2013).
13Our Online Appendix contains additional, detailed information on our data (Sec-
tions A & B), regression models that we display only graphically (Section C), and
an extensive number of robustness checks (Section D). Tables and Figures from the
appendix are referenced by these letters.
14As mentioned above, a dyad is coded as different when more than 50% of all mem-
bers differ on the given dimension. Recall that we do not define the ethnic dimension
of a dyad a priori. Hence linguistic dyads can also differ on religious grounds and vice
versa.
15In Table D2 we interact the language and religion variables from Model 2 but find
no support for the importance of an interaction effect.
16See Figure C for actual effect estimates.
17In this graph, we do not display the results for Latin America, the Caribbean or
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Oceania for a lack of ethnic civil war in these regions. These regions are included in
all other analyses.
18The corresponding regressions for the Cold War period can be found in Table D1.
19Additional inconclusive models with a continuous measure of time are included
in Table D1 and Figures D1 and D2. Our results are in line with previous empirical
research concerned with either intra- (Fox, 2002, 2005) or interstate conflicts (Gartzke
and Gleditsch, 2006).
20As opposed to the Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira (Bruk and Apenchenko, 1964), which
is known to suffer from ideologically driven anti-religious bias, EPR was coded by
a large number of experts who were entirely free to highlight any politically salient
cleavages. Selection on the dependent variable is also unlikely as confirmed by Birnir
et al.’s (2011) use of the much more inclusive dataset A-MAR to replicate previous
EPR-based studies covering the link between exclusion and civil war.
21We recognize that our political power access variables are potentially endogenous
to conflict. Yet research by one of the authors instruments for ethnic exclusion based
on variation in colonial strategies and finds that naive studies underestimate the effect
of exclusion on civil war onset.
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Figures
Figure 1: Linguistic and religious segments for the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba from
Nigeria.
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Figure 3: Religion tree example.
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Figure 4: Ethnic power constellation and ethnic cleavages in Nigeria in 2006 (LD =
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Figure 5: Estimated effects of ethnic cleavages in different world regions. Grey lines
represent 95% confidence intervals. Full regression models in Table C1.
Figure 6: Estimated effects of various major religious identities in an ethnic group
dyad on civil war onset. Grey lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Full regression
model in Table C2.
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Table 1: Logit models of ethnic differences and civil war onset, 1946-2009.
DV: Ethnic Civil War Onset (1) (2) (3) (4)
Linguistic Difference (Mean) 1.150∗∗
(0.393)
Religious Difference (Mean) 0.021
(0.276)
Linguistic Difference (Dummy) 1.066∗∗∗
(0.324)
Religious Difference (Dummy) -0.102 1.477∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.439)
Only Ling. Diff. (Dummy) 1.794∗∗∗ 1.754∗∗∗
(0.455) (0.448)
Only Rel. Diff. (Dummy) 1.020
(0.574)
Ling. + Rel. Difference (Dummy) 1.583∗∗∗
(0.448)
Excluded 0.907∗∗∗ 0.935∗∗∗ 0.841∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗
(0.219) (0.219) (0.201) (0.201)
Downgraded 1.491∗∗∗ 1.491∗∗∗ 1.499∗∗∗ 1.509∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.293) (0.291) (0.292)
Groupsize 1.862∗∗∗ 1.791∗∗∗ 1.911∗∗∗ 1.769∗∗∗
(0.422) (0.425) (0.444) (0.435)
War History 0.710∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.080)
Ln(GDP p.c.) -0.253∗ -0.256∗ -0.263∗ -0.279∗∗
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.103)
Ln(Population) 0.038 0.037 0.039 0.033
(0.103) (0.103) (0.102) (0.104)
Peace Years -0.081 -0.081 -0.080 -0.079
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)
Constant -5.237∗∗ -5.055∗∗ -5.638∗∗ -5.359∗∗
(1.863) (1.872) (1.921) (1.938)
Cubic Splines Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 28375 28375 28375 28375
` -1079.917 -1080.050 -1077.327 -1079.203
χ2 677.134 654.110 640.582 663.867
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2: Logit models of ethnic differences and civil war onset after the Cold War.
DV: Ethnic Civil War Onset (5) (6) (7) (8)
Linguistic Difference (Dummy) 1.123∗ 1.124∗∗ 1.129∗
(0.459) (0.432) (0.450)
Religious Difference (Dummy) -0.237 1.461∗
(0.296) (0.652)








Excluded 0.887∗∗ 0.730∗∗ 0.885∗∗ 0.947∗∗
(0.294) (0.266) (0.287) (0.302)
Downgraded 1.519∗∗∗ 1.542∗∗∗ 1.506∗∗∗ 1.546∗∗∗
(0.363) (0.363) (0.360) (0.359)
Groupsize 2.028∗∗ 1.842∗∗ 1.981∗∗ 1.981∗∗
(0.640) (0.572) (0.625) (0.716)
War History 0.341∗∗ 0.343∗∗ 0.345∗∗ 0.323∗∗
(0.122) (0.124) (0.114) (0.116)
Ln(GDP p.c.) -0.295∗∗ -0.306∗∗ -0.307∗∗ -0.318∗∗
(0.109) (0.106) (0.114) (0.111)
Ln(Population) 0.215 0.209 0.228∗ 0.224
(0.115) (0.115) (0.112) (0.118)
Peace Years -0.018 -0.014 -0.017 -0.015
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.048)
Constant -6.882∗∗ -7.237∗∗∗ -7.047∗∗∗ -6.853∗∗
(2.117) (2.085) (2.039) (2.195)
Cubic Splines Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11187 11187 11187 11187
` -534.229 -533.061 -533.875 -528.425
χ2 160.661 146.133 167.378 180.567
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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